Out-of-the-Money CEOs: Private Control Premium and Option Exercises
研究发现，当面临代理权争夺威胁时，CEO行权后卖出股票的速度降低80%，持有股票的速度提高60%，以维持或加强投票权，且这种偏差在私人收益更高或投票权更关键时更明显。
When a proxy contest is looming, the rate at which CEOs exercise options to sell (hold) the resulting shares slows down by 80% (accelerates by 60%), consistent with their desire to maintain or strengthen voting rights when facing challenges. Such deviations are closely aligned with features unique to proxy contests, such as the record dates and nomination status, and are more pronounced when the private benefits are higher or when the voting rights are more crucial. The distortions suggest that incumbents value their stocks higher than the market price when voting rights are valuable for defending control. Received June 3, 2014; accepted August 11, 2015 by Editor David Denis.