Board structure and role of outside directors in private firms
研究了美国私营企业董事会中外部董事的比例高于上市公司，且其选任更响应咨询与监督需求；外部董事比例越高，CEO更替对业绩的敏感性、盈余质量、上市可能性和IPO价值也越高。
Abstract We examine the board composition and the role of outside directors in US private firms. We find that compared with public firms, private firms have a higher proportion of outside directors on the boards and select their outside directors in a more responsive way to their advisory and monitoring needs. We also find that private firms’ CEO turnover–performance sensitivity, earnings quality, going‐public likelihood, and IPO value increase with the proportion of outside directors. These results are consistent with the view that lack of external governance in private firms leads to a greater demand for board monitoring for private firms.