The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement
研究了原告法律资助行业中的贷款是否会破坏和解，发现当原告拥有关于损害赔偿的私人信息时，最优贷款会使所有原告提出相同要求，从而实现完全和解；当被告拥有关于责任可能性的私人信息时，和解可能性不受影响。
A significant policy concern about the emerging plaintiff legal funding industry is that loans will undermine settlement. When the plaintiff has private information about damages, we find that the optimal ( plaintiff-funder) loan induces all plaintiff types to make the same demand, resulting in full settlement; implementation may entail a very high repayment amount. Plaintiffs' attorneys with contingent-fee compensation benefit from such financing, as it eliminates trial costs. When the defendant has private information about his likelihood of being found liable, we find that the likelihood of settlement is unaffected. In both settings the defendant's incentive for care-taking is unaffected.