Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions
通过信任博弈和公共品博弈实验，检验实验室行为能否预测秘鲁团体贷款项目的还款情况，发现被实验认定为“可信”的人确实更少违约，但“信任”倾向与还款无关。
Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics are generalizable to real decisions in nonlaboratory settings. Furthermore, questions persist about whether social capital helps mitigate information asymmetries in credit markets. I examine whether behavior in two laboratory games, Trust and a Public Goods, predicts loan repayments to a Peruvian group-lending microfinance program. Since this program relies on social capital to enforce repayment, this tests the external validity of the games. Individuals identified as “trustworthy” by the Trust Game are indeed less likely to default on their loans. No similar support is found for the game's identification of “trusting” individuals.