On the economics of trials: adversarial process, evidence, and equilibrium bias
将对抗制下双方提供证据的过程建模为策略性序贯搜索博弈，用公理方法刻画法院基于证据的判决，发现即使程序无偏，均衡结果仍可能因抽样成本差异或分布不对称而产生偏差，且多阶段模型中首阶段因双方利益分歧出现偏向被告的偏差。
The adversarial provision of evidence is modeled as a game in which two parties engage in strategic sequential search. An axiomatic approach is used to characterize a court's decision based on the evidence provided. Although this process treats the evidence submissions in an unbiased way, the equilibrium outcome may still exhibit bias. Bias arises from differences in the cost of sampling or asymmetry in the sampling distribution. In a multistage model, a prodefendant bias arises in the first stage from a divergence between the parties' stakes. Finally, the adversarial process generates additional costs that screen out some otherwise meritorious cases.