Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Kenya
研究农民因小额固定成本和现时偏见而推迟购买肥料的现象，发现收获后短期免费配送折扣能有效促进投资，且福利效果优于无干预或高补贴政策。
We model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertilizer and assume some are stochastically present biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias. Such farmers may procrastinate, postponing fertilizer purchases until later periods, when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer. Consistent with the model, many farmers in Western Kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profitable fertilizer investments, but they do invest in response to small, time-limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer (free delivery) just after harvest. Calibration suggests that this policy can yield higher welfare than either laissez-faire policies or heavy subsidies.