Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition
证明，在股票市场具有完全预见性、利润以股息分配且激励分期或递延支付时，股票相关薪酬会强烈激励经理人在重复寡头博弈中支持默契合谋，甚至可在任意折现因子下维持合谋。
I show that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, profits are distributed as dividends, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies. The stock market anticipates the losses from punishment phases and discounts them on stock prices, reducing managers ’ short-run gains from any deviation. When deferred, stock-related incentives may remove all managers ’ shortrun gains from deviation, making collusion supportable at any discount factor. The results hold with managerial contracts of any length.