The Monitoring Incentive of Transactional and Relationship Lenders: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market
研究发现，与关系型贷款人相比，从交易型贷款人借款的企业在贷款发放后经营业绩更差、信用质量恶化更严重，表明交易型贷款人的监督激励较弱。
We identify a group of lenders specializing in syndicating tradable loans (referred to as transactional lenders [TLs]). We show that borrowers borrowing from TLs experience worse operating performance and more severe credit quality deterioration after loan origination compared to those borrowing from relationship lenders. This difference in the postloan issue performance remains robust after controlling for the potential self‐selection of the lender type, or using percentage of traded loans out of all syndicated loans to capture lenders’ propensity for syndicating tradable loans. Our results also remains qualitatively the same after we drop various types of risky loans.