Employee-Manager Alliances and Shareholder Returns from Acquisitions
研究发现，当员工拥有大量投票权时，会与管理层形成联盟，加剧经理与股东的利益冲突，使经理能进行损害价值的收购，且员工支持取决于管理层对员工的优待。
We examine the potential for management-worker alliances when employees have substantial voting rights, and how such alliances affect the balance of power between managers and shareholders. We find that substantial employee voting rights exacerbate the manager-shareholder conflicts. Specifically, they entrench incumbent managers and allow them to pursue value-destroying acquisitions by undercutting the disciplinary influence of the corporate control market. Importantly, employee support for managers is conditional on favorable treatment of employees. Our findings are consistent with Pagano and Volpin’s theory of worker-management alliances and highlight the potential risks associated with large employee voting power.