Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance
研究了巴西分散化有条件现金转移项目中，市长面临连任选举激励如何提升项目降低辍学率的效果，发现可连任市长所在市的项目效果比无连任机会的市长所在市高出36%。
This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36% larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First-term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to be reelected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes. © 2012 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.