Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution
研究了监管机构延迟处置银行的最优策略，发现若监管容忍度低，存款人可能提前挤兑，而从不干预的政策反而比保守干预更稳定。
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes a regulator's optimal strategic delay of resolving banks when the regulator's announcement of the intervention delay endogenously affects the depositors' run propensity. Given intervention, the regulator either liquidates the remaining illiquid assets (“prompt corrective action”) or continues managing the assets at a reduced skill level (“resolution under receivership”). In either case, I show that if the regulator tolerates fewer withdrawals until intervention, the depositors may react by preempting the regulator: they run on the bank more often ex ante. A policy of never intervening can leave the bank more stable than a conservative intervention policy.