Working from home: Too much of a good thing?
构建一般均衡模型，分析技能工人与非技能工人在居家办公选择上的差异，发现企业为节省房地产成本会过度要求居家办公，反而降低技能工人生产率，且土地使用管制会加剧这一效应。
We develop a general equilibrium model with skilled workers who can and unskilled workers who cannot work from home (WFH). Firms choose the amount of time they require workers in the office, whereas workers choose to either work on-site or hybrid, splitting working time between office and home. The endogenous work arrangements determine productivity, wages, and demand for residential and commercial real estate. We find that firms ‘outsource’ workers to their homes to save on real estate costs, and in doing so push beyond the WFH share that maximizes skilled workers’ productivity. This effect is more pronounced if land-use regulations are strict, thus showing another channel through which the latter may reduce productivity. More efficient information and telecommunication technologies allow firms to shift office expenditures toward skilled workers who invest more in home working space. In a nutshell, WFH may well be the ‘new margin of offshoring’ for firms.