Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration
构建理论模型，分析金融约束下中介机构为非法移民提供债务融资，发现更严格的驱逐政策可能因降低违约风险而增加非法移民流入，并恶化移民技能结构。
We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Interme-diaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are more easily en-forceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because of stricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks for inter-mediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We also show that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. While stricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase of debt-financed migration.