Long-Run Performance and Insider Trading in Completed and Canceled Seasoned Equity Offerings
通过分析已完成和取消的增发新股（SEO）前后的长期表现与内幕交易，发现内部人在增发前增加卖出，取消后减少卖出；增发前的内幕交易可预测长期表现，支持内部人利用市场时机窗口发行高估股票。
This paper provides evidence on managerial motives for raising equity by examining long-run performance and insider trading around canceled and completed seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Insider selling increases prior to competed and canceled SEOs, but declines afferward only for canceled offerings. For completed SEOs, pre-filing insider trading is related to long-run performance after completion. For Canceled sEOs, pre-filing insider trading is related to stock performance between filing and cancellation. Finally, changes in dence is consistent with insiders exploiting windows of opportunity by attempting to issue overvalued equity and by canceling the issue when the market reaction to the announcement eliminates the overvaluation.