Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets
研究了网络市场中动态匹配的简单模型，发现若规划者能识别即将离开的代理人，等待市场变厚可大幅降低未匹配比例；否则贪婪匹配接近最优。还设计了机制来揭示代理人的私人离开时间信息。
We introduce a simple model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the composition of the trade network depends endogenously on the matching algorithm. If the planner can identify agents who are about to depart, then waiting to thicken the market substantially reduces the fraction of unmatched agents. If not, then matching agents greedily is close to optimal. We specify conditions under which local algorithms that choose the right time to match agents, but do not exploit the global network structure, are close to optimal. Finally, we consider a setting where agents have private information about their departure times and design a mechanism to elicit this information.