别人做时我也做:拖延的策略模型

DOING IT WHEN OTHERS DO: A STRATEGIC MODEL OF PROCRASTINATION

Economic Inquiry · 2020
被引 7
ABS 3

中文导读

构建了一个策略模型,研究有现时偏好的个体倾向于与他人一起做苦差事,从而形成拖延博弈,分析互动如何加剧或缓解拖延,发现与更拖延的人为伴可能促使自己提前行动。

Abstract

This paper develops a strategic model of procrastination in which present‐biased agents prefer to perform an onerous task with someone else. This turns their decision of when to perform the task into a procrastination game —a dynamic coordination game between present‐biased players. The model characterizes the conditions under which interaction mitigates or exacerbates procrastination. A procrastinator matched with a worse procrastinator may perform her task earlier than she otherwise would: she wants to avoid the increased temptation that her peer's company would generate. Procrastinators can thus use bad company as a commitment device to mitigate their self‐control problem.

拖延诱惑动态不一致协调博弈行为经济学