Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?
研究发现参与价格固定卡特尔的公司管理者并未受到公司治理或法律体系的问责，反而享有更高的工作保障、现金奖金和股票期权收益，且法律制裁主要针对公司而非个人。
We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and more aggressively take profits from appreciated stock option awards. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers seem to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.