Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
通过实验室实验，研究玩家在一次性博弈中的行动是否基于对对手行为的预期，发现玩家在陈述信念和选择行动时对游戏的认知不一致，且平均近半数情况下未对自身信念做出最优反应。
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players' actions can be viewed as responses to underlying expectations about their opponent's behaviour. In our laboratory experiments, subjects play a set of 14 two-person 3×3 games and state beliefs about which actions they expect their opponents to play. The data sets from the two tasks are largely inconsistent. Rather, we find evidence that the subjects perceive the games differently when they (i) choose actions and (ii) state beliefs—their stated beliefs reveal deeper strategic thinking than their actions. On average, they fail to best respond to their own stated beliefs in almost half of the games. The inconsistency is confirmed by estimates of a unified statistical model that jointly uses the actions and the belief statements. There, we can control for decision noise and formulate a statistical test that rejects consistency. Effects of the belief elicitation procedure on subsequent actions are mostly insignificant. Copyright 2008, Wiley-Blackwell.