Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?
研究1997年Medicare调整医生支付区域后，发现支付率提高2%导致医疗服务量增加3%，择期手术反应更强，但对患者健康影响较小。
We investigate whether physicians' financial incentives influence health care supply, technology diffusion, and resulting patient outcomes. In 1997, Medicare consolidated the geographic regions across which it adjusts physician payments, generating area-specific price shocks. Areas with higher payment shocks experience significant increases in health care supply. On average, a 2 percent increase in payment rates leads to a 3 percent increase in care provision. Elective procedures such as cataract surgery respond much more strongly than less discretionary services. Non-radiologists expand their provision of MRIs, suggesting effects on technology adoption. We estimate economically small health impacts, albeit with limited precision.