Capital Controls with International Reserve Accumulation: Can this Be Optimal?
受中国经验启发，研究央行能进入国际资本市场而私人部门不能的经济体，发现快速增长经济体在无资本流动时福利更高，并建议国内利率应暂时高于国际利率、积累更多外国资产。
Motivated by the Chinese experience, we analyze an economy where the central bank has access to international capital markets, but the private sector does not. The central bank is modeled as a Ramsey planner who can choose the domestic interest rate and the level of international reserves. Consumers are credit-constrained as in Woodford (1990). We find that a rapidly growing economy has a higher welfare without capital mobility. In the Chinese context, we argue that the domestic interest rate should be temporarily above the international rate and that there should be more foreign asset accumulation than in an open economy.