The Costs and Benefits of Clawback Provisions in CEO Compensation
研究了CEO薪酬追回条款的成本与收益，发现该条款能延长激励期限、抑制财务错报，但也会增加业绩衡量噪音、降低努力水平和公司价值，实证支持了模型预测。
We analyze the costs and benefits of clawback provisions that enable firms to recover incentive compensation from top management if financials are restated. In a simple contracting model, we find that a clawback provision effectively lengthens the horizon of incentives and curbs misreporting. However, such a provision can add noise to the underlying performance measure, reducing managerial effort and firm value. Our empirical tests support the model’s predictions regarding which types of firms are likely to voluntarily use clawback provisions. We also document that clawback provisions are associated with higher reporting quality, greater CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, and higher CEO compensation.