Uncertainty Aversion and Systemic Risk
基于奈特不确定性提出系统性风险新理论，解释坏消息如何通过不确定性规避引发传染和雪崩效应，并分析对银行挤兑、股市崩盘及政策应对的启示。
We propose a new theory of systemic risk based on Knightian uncertainty (“ambiguity”). Because of uncertainty aversion, bad news on one asset class worsens investors’ expectations on other asset classes, so that idiosyncratic risk creates contagion, snowballing into systemic risk. In a Diamond and Dybvig setting, uncertainty-averse investors are less prone to run individual banks, but runs can be systemic and are associated with stock market crashes and flight to quality. Finally, increasing uncertainty makes the financial system more fragile and more prone to crises. Implications for the current public policy debate on management of financial crisis are derived.