Sharing Risk with the Government: How Taxes Affect Corporate Risk Taking
利用美国各州企业所得税税率变化的准自然实验，发现税收增加会降低企业风险承担，主要通过调整经营周期和减少研发风险，但税收减免无显著影响，且债权人约束和亏损抵补规则调节了这种效应。
Using 113 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, we provide evidence on how taxes affect corporate risk‐taking decisions. Higher taxes reduce expected profits more for risky projects than for safe ones, as the government shares in a firm's upside but not in its downside. Consistent with this prediction, we find that risk taking is sensitive to taxes, albeit asymmetrically: the average firm reduces risk in response to a tax increase (primarily by changing its operating cycle and reducing R&D risk) but does not respond to a tax cut. We trace the asymmetry back to constraints on risk taking imposed by creditors. Finally, tax loss‐offset rules moderate firms’ sensitivity to taxes by allowing firms to partly share downside risk with the government.