Corporate Governance, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Information Flow
研究发现，反收购条款较少的公司特质风险更高，交易更活跃，私有信息流动更多，股价更能反映未来盈利信息；机构交易（尤其是并购套利者）强化了治理与特质风险的关系，表明对控制权市场的开放通过鼓励私有信息收集和交易提高了股价信息含量。
ABSTRACT We study the relationship of corporate governance policy and idiosyncratic risk. Firms with fewer antitakeover provisions display higher levels of idiosyncratic risk, trading activity, private information flow, and information about future earnings in stock prices. Trading interest by institutions, especially those active in merger arbitrage, strengthens the relationship of governance to idiosyncratic risk. Our results indicate that openness to the market for corporate control leads to more informative stock prices by encouraging collection of and trading on private information. Consistent with an information‐flow interpretation, the component of volatility unrelated to governance is associated with the efficiency of corporate investment.