The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the UK
从竞标者角度分析现金、债务和股权等支付方式在收购竞争中的威慑作用，理论模型预测现金出价能更好威慑竞争对手，并用1995-96年英国数据验证。
The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analysed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirements for a signalling game. The model predicts notably that cash offers signal a high‐valuing bidder, strongly determined to acquire the target firm. Moreover, cash offers deter competition better than debt or equity offers. The theoretical results are validated with data from the UK over 1995–96.