SPINOFFS AND THE MARKET FOR IDEAS*
研究员工如何通过分拆企业实现创意商业化，由于创意质量信息不对称，好创意者选择分拆，平庸创意者出售，导致企业规模分布不随规模变化，与数据吻合。
We present a theory of entry through spinoffs where workers generate ideas and possess private information concerning their quality. Because quality is privately observed, adverse selection implies that the market can only offer a price that reflects the average quality of ideas sold. Only workers with good ideas decide to spin off, whereas workers with mediocre ideas sell them. Existing firms pay a price for ideas sold in the market that implies zero expected profits. Hence, firms’ project selection is independent of firm size, which can lead to scale‐independent growth. This mechanism results in invariant firm‐size distributions that resemble the data.