How Do Hospitals Respond to Price Changes?
利用1988年政策改革带来的诊断特定价格大幅变化，发现医院主要通过“升级编码”将患者归入价格涨幅最大的诊断代码来应对，尤其是营利性医院，而入院量、护理强度或质量未见显著变化。
This paper examines hospital responses to changes in diagnosis-specific prices by exploiting a 1988 policy reform that generated large price changes for 43 percent of Medicare admissions. I find hospitals responded primarily by “upcoding” patients to diagnosis codes with the largest price increases. This response was particularly strong among for-profit hospitals. I find little evidence hospitals increased the volume of admissions differentially for diagnoses subject to the largest price increases, despite the financial incentive to do so. Neither did they increase intensity or quality of care in these diagnoses, suggesting hospitals do not compete for patients at the diagnosis level.