公司治理与本土偏好

Corporate Governance and the Home Bias

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2003
被引 505
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

论证大股东控制导致美国投资者在均衡中产生本土偏好,并构建非控股股东可投资的全球组合,发现该组合能解释美国投资者的投资权重,而传统市场组合无额外解释力。

Abstract

In most countries, many of the largest corporations are controlled by large shareholders.We show that, under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holdings of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium.We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders.This available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio.In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power.This result holds when we control for country characteristics.

公司治理控制权可用世界投资组合本土偏好