Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence
通过伯特兰-埃奇沃思寡头实验，分析企业合并对价格的影响，发现不对称市场比对称市场价格更低，合并整体上反竞争但价格上升不显著。
We analyse the impact of mergers in experimental Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies. Treatment variables are the number of firms (two, three) and the distribution of industry capacity (symmetric, asymmetric). Consistent with a dynamic collusion model, we find that, even though they are more concentrated, asymmetric markets exhibit lower prices than symmetric markets with the same number of firms. Consistent with the static Nash prediction, duopolies charge higher prices than triopolies when we control for (a)symmetry. The overall impact of a merger (which comprises both fewer firms and an asymmetry) is anti-competitive but the price increase is not significant. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s).