Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-management Appointments
发现，投资银行对发行方提供相对乐观的研究报告，甚至仅仅是提供研究覆盖（无论方向如何），都能吸引到证券发行的联合管理任命。这些任命有助于银行与发行方建立关系，从而大幅增加未来赢得更有利可图的主管理任命的几率，即使存在历史排他性银行关系也是如此。
We show that relatively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments for securities offerings. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase the banks' chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.