Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring
研究了企业主如何通过事前监督（如内部控制）和事后监督（如审计）来限制管理层因股权激励而可能实施的欺诈行为，并分析了监督对最优股权方案和欺诈均衡水平的影响。
In response to equity compensation contracts that encourage managers to commit fraud as well as provide productive effort, owners may choose to monitor the manager to limit the fraud. We examine the firm owners’ incentives to perform both ex ante monitoring, such as internal controls, and ex post monitoring, such as audits, in a model that includes the reputational damages caused when a fraud is discovered. We provide conditions under which the owner prefers either more or less monitoring, and examine the effect of additional monitoring on the optimal equity package and equilibrium level of fraud.