Efficiency Wages and X‐Inefficiencies
研究了在代理人承担有限责任时，组织如何设计最优的多任务激励方案，发现工资水平随代理人自由裁量权和组织利润上升，且完全消除内部分配冲突通常并非最优，由此产生的寻租成本构成X低效率的度量。
Within most organizations, agents may spend time on a variety of tasks — productive and redistributive. In this paper, I derive an optimal multi‐task incentive scheme under the assumption that agents have limited liability. The wage level is shown to increase with an agent's discretion and the organization's profits. With multiple agents, it is generally not optimal for the principal to fully eliminate distributional conflict within the organization. The resulting influence costs constitute a measure of X‐inefficiency. The analysis illuminates the relationship between competition and influence costs, emphasizing the role of the organization's production technology.