Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters
研究了选民存在自我控制问题时，政府如何通过积累公共债务来回应选民解除承诺的愿望，并发现禁止非流动性资产可能提高福利，为宪法中的平衡预算规则提供了新理由。
Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for benevolent government intervention. This paper presents a model of public debt where voters have self-control problems and attempt to commit using illiquid assets. In equilibrium, government accumulates debt to respond to individuals' desire to undo their commitments, which leads individuals to rebalance their portfolio, in turn feeding into a demand for further debt accumulation. As a consequence, (i) large (and distortionary) government debt accumulation occurs, and (ii) banning illiquid assets could improve individuals' welfare. These results offer a new rationale for balanced budget rules in constitutions to restrain governments' responses to voters' self-control problems.