Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation
通过礼物交换博弈实验，研究了互惠和重复博弈激励在一次性与重复互动中的交互效应，发现重复博弈强化了互惠行为，部分参与者模仿互惠，长期互动是兼容互惠的合同执行机制。
Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one‐shot and repeated) of a gift‐exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that, in the repeated game, some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that long‐term interaction is a “reciprocity‐compatible” contract enforcement device.