Imprecision in Accounting Measurement: Can It Be Value Enhancing?
研究会计计量不精确性如何与管理者独占的投资项目事前盈利能力信息不对称相互作用，发现一定程度的计量不精确反而可能提升企业价值，并刻画了最优不精确度及其关键决定因素。
Accounting measurements of firms' investments are usually imprecise. We study the economic consequences of such imprecision when it interacts with information asymmetry regarding an investment project's ex ante profitability, known only by the firm's managers. Absent agency and risk‐sharing considerations, we find that some degree of accounting imprecision could actually be value enhancing. We characterize the optimal degree of imprecision and identify its key determinants. The greater the information asymmetry regarding the project's profitability, the greater is the imprecision that should be tolerated in the measurement of the firm's investment.