Collusion with intertemporal price dispersion
研究企业如何通过跨期价格离散（如价格周期和促销）来掩盖价格信息，从而维持合谋，发现消费者关注度低时价格离散更有效，但过低时价格上升也会成为问题。
Abstract We develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price dispersion. Dispersion clouds consumer price awareness, encouraging firms to coordinate on dispersed prices. Our theory generates a collusive rationale for price cycles and sales. Patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price. For less patient firms, monopoly prices must be punctuated with fleeting sales. The most robust structure involves price cycles that resemble Edgeworth cycles. Low consumer attentiveness enhances the effectiveness of price dispersion by reducing the payoff to deviations involving price reductions. However, for sufficiently low attentiveness, price rises are also a concern.