CEOs Under Fire: The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation
研究发现，外部需求高的内部董事（如兼任外部董事）更可能成为CEO，他们的存在增强了董事会监督，表现为强制CEO更替对会计业绩的敏感度提高，以及CEO薪酬对股票业绩的敏感度提高。
Abstract This study examines board monitoring when a credible chief executive officer (CEO) replacement is on the board. Inside directors whose talents are in greater demand externally, as reflected by their holding outside directorships, are more likely to become CEOs, and their presence is associated with greater forced CEO turnover sensitivity to accounting performance and CEO compensation sensitivity to stock performance. These results reveal that certain insiders strengthen board monitoring by serving as a readily available CEO replacement and contradict the presumption that all insiders are under CEO control. Furthermore, the results persist when accounting for the endogenous firm selection of talented inside directors.