Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation with Contingency Fees
本文构建了一个包含信息不对称和代理成本的诉讼模型，比较英美两种费用转移规则对和解金额、诉讼支出、原告胜诉率和起诉动机的影响，结果与现有实证证据一致。
This article theoretically compares the British and American fee-shifting rules in their influences on the behavior of the litigants and the outcomes of litigation. We build up a comprehensive litigation model with asymmetric information and agency costs, which makes it possible to make comparison on a broad arrays of issues in a single unified framework. We then solve for the equilibria under both American and British rules, and thereby compare their equilibrium settlement amounts and rates, expenditures incurred in trials, as well as the plaintiff's chances of winning and incentive to sue. The theoretical results are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence.