A Theory of Hard and Soft Information
研究了硬信息（已验证）和软信息（如预测、未审计声明）两种沟通渠道的最优披露，发现软信息可能包含与硬信息同样多的信息，但单独依赖软信息往往传递坏消息，且硬信息强制披露会减少软信息传递。
ABSTRACT We study optimal disclosure via two competing communication channels: hard information whose value has been verified, and soft disclosures such as forecasts, unaudited statements, and press releases. We show that certain soft disclosures may contain as much information as hard disclosures, and we establish that: (1) exclusive reliance on soft disclosures tends to convey bad news, (2) credibility is greater when unfavorable information is reported, and (3) misreporting is more likely when soft information is issued jointly with hard information. We also show that a soft report that is seemingly unbiased in expectation need not indicate truthful reporting. We demonstrate that mandatory disclosure of hard information reduces the transmission of soft information, and that the aggregation of hard with soft information will turn all information soft. JEL Classifications: D72; D82; D83; G20.