Managerial Attributes, Incentives, and Performance
研究了高管薪酬激励中可观测和不可观测因素的作用，发现管理者固定效应解释了大部分激励差异，且与公司绩效和风险相关。
Abstract We examine the relative importance of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in determining executive compensation incentives and firm policy, risk, and performance. First, we decompose executive incentives into time-variant and time-invariant firm and manager components. Manager fixed effects supply 73% (60%) of explained variation in delta (vega). Second, controlling for manager fixed effects alters parameter estimates and corresponding inference on observed firm and manager characteristics. Third, larger CEO delta (vega) fixed effects predict better firm performance (riskier corporate policies and higher firm risk). These results suggest that the delta (vega) fixed effect captures managerial ability (risk aversion). Received September 7, 2018; editorial decision February 21, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.