Marriage and Managers' Attitudes to Risk
研究发现单身CEO所在公司股票回报波动性更高、投资政策更激进，且不响应特质风险变化，支持婚姻本身影响风险偏好而非仅反映固有差异。
Marital status can both reflect and affect individual preferences. We explore the impact of marriage on corporate chief executive officers (CEOs) and find that firms run by single CEOs exhibit higher stock return volatility, pursue more aggressive investment policies, and do not respond to changes in idiosyncratic risk. These effects are weaker for older CEOs. Our findings continue to hold when we use variation in divorce laws across states to instrument for CEO marital status, which supports the hypothesis that marriage itself drives choices rather than it just reflecting innate heterogeneity in preferences. We explore various potential explanations for why single CEOs may be less risk averse. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1926 . This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.