Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets
构建了一个动态逆向选择模型，研究新旧商品市场的相互作用，发现二手车市场不会消失、交易量可能很大且扭曲程度低于预期，并扩展至不同可靠性品牌，得出可检验的预测。
We present a dynamic model of adverse selection to examine the interactions between new and used goods markets. We find that the used market never shuts down, the volume of trade can be large, and distortions are lower than previously thought. New cars prices can be higher under adverse selection than in its absence. An extension to several brands that differ in reliability leads to testable predictions of the effects of adverse selection. Unreliable brands have steeper price declines and lower volumes of trade. We contrast these predictions with those of a model where brands physically depreciate at different rates.