Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
分析社会保险中经济激励与工作规范的相互作用，发现当受益人口比例高时工作规范会弱化，导致选民选择较低福利；并讨论规范调整滞后如何使失业率暂时变化造成受益人数持续影响。
The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous bene.ts than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.