Contracts for Agents with Biased Beliefs: Some Theory and an Experiment
实验检验了代理人对自己能力有偏见时的委托代理模型，发现过度自信的工人工资更低，且利润最大化的合同会根据自信程度调整激励。
This paper experimentally tests the predictions of a principalagent model in which the agent has biased beliefs about his ability. Overconfident workers are found to earn lower wages than underconfident ones because they overestimate their expected payoff, and principals adjust their offers accordingly. Moreover, the profit-maximizing contract distorts effort by varying incentives according to self-confidence, although only the most successful principals use this strategy. These findings have implications for the labor market; in particular, self-confidence is often correlated with gender, implying that principals would prefer to hire men over women simply because they are more overconfident.