Price Dispersion in Mortgage Markets
利用加拿大抵押贷款交易数据，研究发现平均折扣和利率离散度上升，价格离散主要由消费者议价能力而非风险导致，表明竞争不足但具有消费者特异性。
Using transaction‐level data on C anadian mortgage contracts, we document an increase in the average discount negotiated off the posted price and in rate dispersion. Our aim is to identify the beneficiaries of discounting and to test whether dispersion is caused by price discrimination. The standard explanation for dispersion in credit markets is risk‐based pricing. Our contracts are guaranteed by government‐backed insurance, so risk cannot be the main factor. We find that lenders set prices that reflect consumer bargaining leverage, not just costs. The presence of dispersion implies a lack of competition, but our results show this to be consumer specific.