Incentive Schemes, Sorting, and Behavioral Biases of Employees: Experimental Evidence
实验研究企业激励方案的凸性如何与员工过度自信相互作用，影响员工对方案的分类选择和工作绩效，发现过度自信者更倾向非线性方案，而线性方案吸引低自信者，企业可据此设计方案筛选员工并降低工资成本。
We investigate how the convexity of a firm's incentives interacts with worker overconfidence to affect sorting decisions and performance. We demonstrate, experimentally, that overconfident employees are more likely to sort into a nonlinear incentive scheme over a linear one, even though this reduces pay for many subjects and despite the presence of clear feedback. Additionally, the linear scheme attracts demotivated, underconfident workers who perform below their ability. Our findings suggest that firms may design incentive schemes that adapt to the behavioral biases of employees to “sort in” (“sort away”) attractive (unattractive) employees; such schemes may also reduce a firm's wage bill.