Optimal Nonlinear Pricing by a Dominant Firm under Competition
研究主导企业与小企业竞争时的最优非线性定价问题，发现主导企业通过设计连续未选中的报价来约束对手并提取更多消费者剩余，并讨论了反垄断含义。
We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm competing with a minor firm. The dominant firm offers a general tariff first, and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by a buyer choosing her purchases. By developing a mechanism-design approach to solve the subgame perfect equilibrium, we characterize the dominant firm’s optimal nonlinear tariff, which exhibits convexity and yet can display quantity discounts. In equilibrium the dominant firm uses a continuum of unchosen offers to constrain its rival’s potential deviations and extract more surplus from the buyer. Antitrust implications are also discussed.