Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?
研究拥有私人信息的卖家在序贯拍卖两件随机等价商品时，先卖好货还是差货的激励问题，发现先卖好货能产生印象效应，成为唯一纯策略均衡，并提高预期收入。
Should a seller with private information sell the best or worst goods first? Considering the sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent goods, we find that the seller has an incentive to impress buyers by selling the better good first because the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in the values of the goods across periods. When this impression effect is strong enough, selling the better good first is the unique pure‐strategy equilibrium. By credibly revealing to all buyers the seller's ranking of the goods, an equilibrium strategy of sequencing the goods reduces buyer information rents and increases expected revenues in accordance with the linkage principle .