Individual and Aggregate Real Balances in a Random‐Matching Model
研究货币随机匹配模型中单一定价均衡的性质，发现存在连续统的均衡，其总实际货币余额相同但货币持有分布不同。
This article investigates the characteristics of stationary single‐price equilibrium in a monetary random‐matching model where agents can hold an arbitrary amount of divisible money and where production is costly. At such an equilibrium, agents' money holdings are endogenously determined and uniformly bounded. A refinement of weakly undominated strategies is argued to be necessary. It is shown that a continuum of single‐price equilibria indexed by the aggregate real‐money balance exists if one such equilibrium exists. Equilibria with different money‐holdings upper bounds, hence different distributions, but with identical aggregate real‐money balances can coexist.