The Impact of Regulation on Mortgage Risk: Evidence from India
利用1995至2010年间印度超过百万笔贷款数据，研究快速变化的监管如何影响抵押贷款发放与风险，发现贷款规模和杠杆相关的监管变化会引发贷款违约，而加速资产分类为不良资产则显著降低违约概率和损失。
We employ loan-level data on over a million loans disbursed in India between 1995 and 2010 to understand how fast-changing regulation impacted mortgage lending and risk. Our paper uses changes in regulatory treatment discontinuities associated with loan size and leverage to detect regulation-induced loan delinquencies. We also find that an acceleration in the classification of assets as nonperforming resulted in substantially lower delinquency probabilities and losses given delinquency.